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Most studies about country-specific experiences with eco-
nomic liberalization and deregulation focus on concrete
factors and events that lead countries to change their
policy direction. The roles of specific triggers such as
exogenous shocks and dramatic events, which are visible,
are often given primacy as drivers of radical shifts in policy
paradigm. However, the internal processes and dynamics
and the gradual evolution and acceptance of ideas within
the bureaucratic and political intelligentsia that enable and
sustain such shifts in policy often get neglected. Rahul
Mukherji’s book titled, “Globalization and Deregulation:
Ideas, Interests and Institutional Change in India” is a well-
researched and insightful read that attempts to answer
some of these questions that have not received enough
attention in existing country studies on institutional change
and economic reforms. It asks whether changes are driven
by an assessment and critical evaluation of prevailing
conditions or by the appeal of new ideas, whether they are
driven by exogenous shocks or by the accumulation of
endogenous processes or both. Mukherji stresses the
importance of the internal dynamics of change and the
interplay of various actors within nations in setting the
stage for dramatic shifts in policy at some later date in the
context of India’s economic liberalization.
The central argument of this book is that India’s adoption
of a new economic policy in 1991 was driven by a longer
process of home-grown, ideational change that had taken
root during the late 1970s and through the 1980s. This was
brought to a “tipping point” by the exogenous shock of the
Gulf War and the resulting Balance of Payment (BoP) crisis in
1991. At the heart of this change was an acceptance of the
failure of India’s earlier inward looking policies of import
substitution and state intervention to generate growth, and
recognition of the need for a new outward oriented policy
framework among all key actors. Mukherji highlights how
endogenously driven changes in ideology among the tech-
nocracy through the 1980s and the support extended by the
ruling polity to the technocrats during the crisis and in its
immediate aftermath, made possible India’s re-orientation
to a path of industrial deregulation and reforms in 1991.Peer-review under responsibility of Indian Institute of Management
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2015.04.009Mukherji presents a useful analytical framework for
understanding India’s economic liberalization in Chapter 1.
He proposes two models for understanding institutional and
social change processes; the “punctuated equilibrium
model” where “change is characterized by critical junc-
tures when an exogenous shock brings about a drastic
change in continuous processes or institutional patterns”
and the “tipping point model” where “endogenous and
continuous processes, rather than external shocks, are
important for understanding dramatic change” and where
“the change can look quite drastic after an internally driven
process has brought the system to the threshold of
change”. India, according to Mukherji fits the “tipping
point” model because without underlying mental pre-
paredness and the institutional adoption of an ideology that
favoured industrial deregulation and opening up of the
economy among key actors, economic liberalization could
not have taken off or been sustained. The book notes that
this transformation in mindset was aided by the visible
failure of an import substitution-led development strategy
and a growing fiscal deficit at home, and the decline of the
Soviet model of development coupled with the demon-
strated success of the export led growth strategy in East
Asia.
To substantiate this point, in Chapters 2 and 3, respec-
tively, the book compares India’s BoP crisis of 1991 with
that of 1966, and the differing reactions and policy re-
sponses under the two cases, based on accounts from in-
ternal reports and discussions during these events. The
book argues that the key difference between these two
relatively similar episodes is that the 1966 crisis did not
lead to a change in policy paradigm because the underlying
transformation in ideology and preparedness was missing.
Mukherji highlights how despite two substantive reports in
1966 (one of these being the famous Bell Commission
report) which criticized the government’s industrial
licensing policies and recommended switching from an
import substituting industrialization strategy as well as
devaluation of the rupee to promote exports, leading
technocrats and politicians continued to support state
intervention. Devaluation was internally opposed by
eminent policy makers and by Indian industry on the
grounds that India’s exports faced inelastic demand and
that it would only fuel inflation. The book narrates how Mrs.
Gandhi wavered on the devaluation package and the se-
crecy with which negotiations took place between Mrs.
Gandhi, the US government and the World Bank, without
the knowledge of key functionaries like the Commerce and
142 Book reviewFinance Ministers, to highlight how entrenched the views
were on import substitution and industrial licensing among
the ruling polity. Although devaluation was finally under-
taken, this was done solely to secure foreign assistance and
not driven by a strong conviction among the executive
branch and the technocracy about the need to change
policy direction. The experience with liberalization
following the 1966 crisis was thus short lived as the gov-
ernment reverted to more stringent regulation of trade and
industry in 1969. As the book argues, liberalization and
deregulation did not take off in 1966 because the under-
lying ideational changes had not occurred to enable a
tipping point to be reached.
The 1991 BoP crisis, in contrast, was preceded by a
gradual change in ideas in the preceding decade, as re-
flected in several reports during the 1980s which recom-
mended the removal of industrial and financial controls,
prudent foreign exchange management, devaluation of the
rupee, aggressive export promotion policies, and facilita-
tion of foreign technical collaborations and FDI. These
ideas, the book argues, helped inform the economic re-
forms that were initiated by Rajiv Gandhi, including the
deregulation of domestic investment under the MRTP Act,
de-licensing of many industrial products, efforts to improve
the management of public sector entities, import liber-
alization, introduction of export promotion incentives, and
reduction in personal and corporate income taxes. How-
ever, Mukherji points out that this period continued to be
marked by political interference with reforms and internal
deregulation took place without fiscal prudence, without
the discipline of global competition and without sufficient
focus on attracting foreign capital. The result was fiscal
disarray, mounting commercial debt obligations and debt
servicing costs, which when confronted with Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, the subsequent rise in oil prices and fall
in remittances from the Gulf, and the fall of the Soviet
Union, brought India to the brink of bankruptcy. But this is
where, according to the book, the ideational framework
that had taken root during the pre-crisis period helped
become an agent of change and enabled the 1991 crisis to
reach a tipping point.
The emergence of a critical mass of reformist techno-
crats with liberal economic ideologies, who understood
international best practices, recognized India’s economic
problems, and could engage with the World Bank and the
IMF along with their empowerment by the political elite,
made possible the adoption of an economic liberalization
and deregulation programme in 1991. The book provides
numerous examples of key actors (Manmohan Singh, P
Chidambaram, Montek Ahluwalia, Shankar Acharya, C.
Rangarajan, Gopi Arora), during and prior to the crisis and
the critical support extended by the PMO’s office under the
stewardship of P. V. Narasimha Rao, to illustrate convinc-
ingly how embedded the conviction was about reforms and
liberalization among the technocratic and political elite.
The events of 1990e91 were thus only a proximate cause.
Mukherji further stresses the endogenous and home-grown
nature of this change by highlighting how the reform
agenda deviated in many respects from the Washington
consensus. While there was broad acceptance of the need
for fiscal prudence, a competitive exchange rate, trade
liberalization and privatization, and articulation of thisphilosophy in the budget of July 1991, Indian policy makers
were not aligned with the international institutions on is-
sues such as disinvestment of public sector enterprises,
social expenditures and labour reforms. Hence, reforms
were not imposed by outsiders but were “tempered with
the imperatives of an open democratic society”.
The discussion of the contrasting experiences during the
1966 and 1991 crises from an ideational change perspective
is followed by an interesting account of the successful
deregulation experience in India’s telecom sector in
Chapter 4 and the unsuccessful experience with power
sector reforms in Andhra Pradesh, in Chapter 5. The chap-
ter on telecommunications highlights how the confluence of
new ideas regarding the role of telecommunications in
development, the extension of political support to tech-
nocrats to implement telecom reforms, and the institution
of new regulatory structures enabled the successful liber-
alization of India’s telecommunications sector. In partic-
ular, it notes how a layered approach to institution building
with the creation of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India (TRAI) and the gradual expansion and strengthening of
the latter’s mandate on the edges of the incumbent regu-
lator and service provider, the Department of Telecom-
munications, played an important role. In stark contrast,
the discussion on the power sector highlights how despite
commitment by a pro-reform Chief Minister to promoting
private sector investment and competition in the power
sector and despite available technocratic capacity, eco-
nomics was trumped by the mass politics of populist
promises of free electricity to the agricultural lobby. As
Mukherji points out, it was easier to find political support
for free electricity than for progressive subsidization of
electricity by deregulating tariffs.
The discussion of these two very different sectorial ex-
periences with deregulation illustrates effectively, the
context-dependence of any reform process and the
importance of creating strong and independent institutions
to manage conflicts of interest and incumbency challenges.
Further, it highlights how in a democratic polity such as
India, where centre-state relations are complex, and in-
terests across different sections of society are widely
divergent, political support and will is critical to not only
implement but also sustain reforms. At the sectorial level, a
tipping point may or may not be reached depending on the
confluence of conditions and interests. Ideational change is
necessary but may not be sufficient in such political
systems.
Overall, this book provides an analytical framework for
understanding how ideas and interests work together to
cause economic change and how such ideas gradually get
embedded in policies and institutional frameworks. The
book argues convincingly that reforms in India are path-
dependent and not a sudden disruptive process that took
place due to the 1991 BoP crisis. Changes within India’s
executive-technocratic team which led to gradual policy
shifts during the 1980s, prepared the country for subse-
quent deregulation and globalization in 1991.
There are, however, two issues the book could have
delved into further. One of these is the role of industry
chambers and leading business houses in enabling or
thwarting deregulation and liberalization. Although the
reactions of FICCI, ASSOCHAM and certain business interests
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crises, the reasons underlying their policy stance are
addressed rather cursorily. It would have been interesting
to see whether there were differences of opinion across
industries depending on their sectorial advantages and
disadvantages, how labour versus capital-intensive in-
dustries responded to the calls for devaluation and de-
licensing, and also how the thinking and articulation of
positions changed between the two crises due to the advent
of globalization and the transformation of the East Asian
economies during the 1980s.
A second issue which the book could have explored
further is whether the tipping model works similarly for
central versus state level reform processes. While the case
of telecom deregulation was an example of a central policy
change, the case of the power sector was an example of a
state level policy change. The question that arises is
whether the proximity of the agents of change to the mass
electoral base at the state level makes deregulation more
susceptible to the problems of vested interests andconflicts than deregulation that is centrally driven. To what
extent are the two differing sectorial experiences discussed
in this book a result of the central versus state dimension of
the deregulation experience as opposed to specific char-
acteristics and conditions defining these two sectors? The
latter question is pertinent in the current policy environ-
ment where reforms in areas such as labour laws, educa-
tion, land, and taxes which have ramifications for centre-
state relations and powers, are exactly those areas where
reforms have been the slowest and most ridden with con-
flict. Perhaps the author could draw upon his concept of
ideational change and suggest when a tipping point might
be reached to enable the much-awaited reforms in these
latter areas.
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